Abstract. Using samples of China-listed firms during 2005-2012, we analyzed the effects of institutional investors on the cost of capital in terms of whether institutional investors are to hold share, shareholding ratio and shareholding period with the method of ordinary least squares regression and fixed effect model under the perspective of investment behavior heterogeneity. The results show that the institutional investors with higher share proportion can reduce the cost of capital more effectively and improve the level of corporate governance of listed companies. Institutional investors with longer shareholding period have a more significant negative effect on the cost of capital.
Introduction
Institutional investors have a very strong incentive to actively participate in corporate governance since they are the direct stakeholder of companies, they could exert an important influence on the governance environment by effective external supervision. Black (1990) said that institutional investors mechanism is an effective corporate governance mechanism to solve the issues of target companies. However, it is a controversial point for the governance role of institutional investors. Some authors think institutional investors can improve the level of corporate governance effectively (Songqin Ye and Jingchang Xu, 2013), but the others think institutional investors cannot play a good role or even a negative role in corporate governance (Yong Fu and Songtao Tan, 2008).
Actually, not all institutional investors are capable and willing to play a supervisory role. The investment behavior and preferences of institutional investors have great differences because of different investment idea and sources of funds. Therefore, institutional investors with heterogeneous investment behaviors may have different impact on corporate governance. Attig et al. (2012) pointed that attaching importance to the heterogeneity of institutional investors' investment behaviors should be the core of the research on the governance role of institutional investors. And reasonable distinction of investment behavior of institutional investors should be the effective way to research the governance level of institutional investors.
Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis
The higher the share proportion of institutional investors, the more the quality of accounting information of the listed companies can be effectively improved (Mallin, 2012) , and the more earnings management behavior can be effectively controlled (Xianhui Bo and Liansheng Wu, 2009). Institutional investors can effectively alleviate the principal-agent problem between shareholders and management, which can make managers to adjust their salary structure and levels (Ozkan and Neslihan, 2007) . Moreover, there is a positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and various proxies index for corporate value, which means institutional investors should be very helpful for improving the value of listed companies (Ailing Pan and Qing Pan, 2013).
Institutional investors are active investors of listed companies and they have larger residual right of claim to the companies' interests. In order to increase investment income, they will supervise management behavior actively to reduce investment risk. Hypothesis 2: There is a significant negative correlation between the share proportion of institutional investors and the cost of capital.
A basic premise of analysis above is that institutional investors have sufficient motivation to reduce the cost of capital and improve the level of corporate governance. As previous analyzed, the heterogeneous investment behavior of institutional investors put a great influence on their governance level, so the research on the heterogeneous investment behavior of institutional investors and the governance differences by it should be the basis to analyze the governance role of institutional investors rationally. Songlian Tang On the basis of the study mentioned above, we divide institutional investors into high shareholding ratio and low shareholding ratio based on the share proportion, and also divide them into long-term holding period and short-term holding period based on the holding period. Through the group study, we can further analyze the different impact of the share proportion and the holding period of institutional investors on the cost of capital. So we put forward the hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Institutional investors with higher shareholding ratio can reduce the cost of capital effectively.
Hypothesis 4: Institutional investors with longer shareholding period can reduce the cost of capital more effectively.
The Sample Selection and Variables

Sample Selection
We select A-share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market during 2005-2012 as the samples and screen them according to the following principles:①Excluding samples with missing data;②Excluding samples of financial and insurance industries; ③Excluding samples with negative or greater ratio more than 1 of asset-liability ratio;④Excluding samples of incomplete stock reform during the period of stock reform; ⑤Excluding samples listed for less than a year; ⑥Excluding samples with extreme values. Considering that institutional investors and the cost of capital may have endogenous problems and it will take long time for institutional investors to show their effects on corporate governance, we choose lagged data.
Variables
Explained Variables. The paper analyzes the influence of institutional investors with heterogeneous investment behavior on the cost of capital. So the explained variable is determined as the cost of capital(R). In order to make the result of the study more objectively, we use OJ model to estimate the cost of capital from the perspective of the expected rate of return in the empirical process, and use CAPM model to estimate the cost of capital from the ex post rate of return in the robustness test.
Explanatory Variables. We divide listed companies into two types of shareholding and non-shareholding of institutional investors. In the samples of listed companies held by institutional investors, the samples are separated into two types of higher shareholding ratio and lower shareholding ratio based on the share proportion. And they are divided into two types of longer holding period and shorter holding period based on the holding period.
Controlled Variables. Referring to the previous studies on the cost of capital(Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Attig et. al,2012; Jianan Zhou and Ting Lei,2014), controlled variables of this paper are Corporate size (Size), the ratio of book value to market value (B/M), Turnover of total assets(Turn), Asset liability ratio(Lev), Company growth rate(Grow).All variables are in Table 1 . The high-low dumb variables of institutional investors shareholding ratio: take the ratio's median as a reference point. If the ratio is greater than or equal to the median, the value is 1. Otherwise, the value is 0. Insti_churn
The long-short dumb variables of institutional investors shareholding deadline: The average annual turnover rate of listed companies with institutional shareholding is converted, choose its median as a reference point. If the value is greater than or equal to the median, the value is 0 which represents short-term institutional investors. Otherwise, the value is 1 which represents long-term institutional investors.
Controlled variables
Size
Corporate size: the natural logarithm of total assets. Lev Asset-liability ratio: the ratio of total liabilities to total assets B /m Book market value ratio: total assets/market value at the end of the period Turn Total asset turnover: Operating income / average total assets Grow Operating sales growth: (operating income this year -operating income last year) / operating income last year Year Dummy variable Industry Dummy variable
Empirical Study Institutional Investors with/without Share Holding and Cost of Capital
In Table 2 , the results from the column (1) to (5) show the relationship between the cost of capital (R) and dummy variables of institutional investors with shareholdings or not ‫.)ݕ݉݉ݑ݀_݅ݐݏ݊ܫ(‬ The results shows that there is a significant negative correlation between ‫‪and‬ݕ݉݉ݑ݀_݅ݐݏ݊ܫ‬ the cost of capital (R), which means that the institutional investors have a negative influence on the cost of capital and they can significantly reduce the cost of capital of listed companies and play a governance role effectively. Therefore, the hypothesis 1 is confirmed.
Model 1:
= ࢻ + ࢻ + ష + ࢻ ୀ ି + + + ࣕ Table 2 . The influence of institutional investors on the cost of capital. "***", "**", "*" represents significant levels (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Variables Coefficient
（ （ （ （ 1） ） ） ） （ （ （ （ 2） ） ） ） （ （ （ （ 3） ） ） ） （ （ （ （ 4） ） ） ） （ （ （ （ 5） ） ） ） ‫ݕ݉݉ݑ݀_݅ݐݏ݊ܫ‬ -0
Share Holding Ratio or Holding Period of Institutional Investors and the Cost of Capital
Selecting the listed companies with shareholding institutional investors as a sample, we analyze the different impact of institutional investors with different shareholding ratio and holding period on the cost of capital.
The Share Holding Ratio of Institutional Investors and the Cost of Capital.
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the cost of capital with OLS regression method based on Model 2. The results are shown in Table 3 .
Model 2:
= ࢻ + ࢻ + ష + ࢻ ୀ ି + + + ࣕ In Table 3 , column (1) shows the regression results of the relationship between the cost of capital (R) and the shareholding ratio of institutional investors ‫)݅ݐݏ݊ܫ(‬ without considering controlled variables. Column (2) shows the regression results of the relationship between the cost of capital (R) and the shareholding ratio of institutional investors ‫)݅ݐݏ݊ܫ(‬ with considering controlled variables. It can be seen that there is a significant negative correlation between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the cost of capital. Therefore, the higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, the lower the cost of capital of listed companies. The hypothesis 2 is confirmed. Table 3 . Institutional investors and cost of capital. "***", "**", "*" represents significant levels (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
High-low Holding Ratio or Long-short Holding Period of Institutional Investors and the Cost of Capital.
The shareholding ratio of institutional investors ‫)݅ݐݏ݊ܫ(‬ is a trailing variable with a lower limit of 0. Therefore, the regression results in column(1) and column (2) Table 3 , We can see that there is a significant negative correlation between the cost of capital and ‫.݊ݎݑ‪݅_ܿℎ‬ݐݏ݊ܫ/‪݅_ℎ݅݃ℎ‬ݐݏ݊ܫ‬ The regression results show that institutional investors can play an effective role of corporate governance when the shareholding ratio reaches a higher level. Holding period of institutional investors can affect the influence of corporate governance on the cost of capital. And the listed companies with longer holding period of institutional investors have the lower cost of capital. So the institutional investors with longer holding period play a more significant role in the corporate governance. The hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 in this paper are confirmed.
Conclusions and Recommendations
From the perspective of heterogeneous behaviors of institutional investors, we analyze the governance role of institutional investors with different investment behaviors. The results are as follows: (1) there is a significant negative correlation between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the cost of capital in the total samples (including listed companies without institutional investors shareholdings) and the samples which have institutional investors shareholdings. Institutional investors can play a positive governance role and reduce the cost of capital of listed companies; (2) in the group samples, the negative relationship between institutional investors with higher shares or with longer holding period and the cost of capital become more significant. The effect of corporate governance is more obvious when the shareholding ratio reaches a higher level or the holding period reaches a longer time.
(1) Broaden the scope and proportion of institutional investors. According to the revised edition "The law of securities investment fund of the People's Republic of China", the fund property should be invested in stocks, bonds, other securities and their derivative products stipulated by the securities regulatory authority under the State Council, and cannot be invested to other kinds of securities, such as underwriting securities. With the development of China's securities market and the improvement of the capital system, the restriction on the investment scope of fund assets will restrict the governance role of institutional investors. So the relevant regulatory authorities should strengthen the system construction of institutional investors, widen institutional investors' investment scope and investment proportion limit, and they are also supposed to guide institutional investors to play a positive role in the stock market actively.
(2) To facilitate the "Joint Action" mechanism of institutional investors. The "Joint Action" mechanism makes institutional investors expand the shareholding size by combining multiple institutional investors with lower shareholding ratio so that they have greater counterbalance to the managers and large shareholders, and they can achieve effective regulation. Therefore, the relevant regulatory authorities should encourage many shareholders to make contact with each other directly to promote the "Joint Action" mechanism actively. Which can reduce the cost of institutional investors to participate in the corporate governance of listed companies and make them play a better governance role.
